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INTERSTITIAL JOURNAL                                D.E. WITTKOWER INTERVIEW
Digital Disruptions
An Interview with D.E. Wittkower
By the Editors of Interstitial Journal
D.E. Wittkower is Professor of Philosophy of Technology and Applied Ethics at Old 
Dominion University. His research involves the intersection of digital and popular 
culture,  politics,  economics,  ethics,  and aesthetics.  Wittkower  has  edited several 
volumes of Open Court's Popular Culture and Philosophy series, including Facebook 
and Philosophy (2010), iPod and Philosophy (2011), Philip K. Dick and Philosophy 
(2011),  and  Ender's  Game and Philosophy (2013).  He is  also the author  of  The 
Philosopher's Book of Questions and Answers (2013), which introduces readers to 
philosophical discourse in accessible and personal terms. 
You've edited a number of essay collections analyzing the intersection of philosophy  
and  popular  culture,  including  works  discussing  the  iPod,  Facebook,  and  the  
writings of Philip K. Dick. Are these collections simply meant to bring philosophy to  
the masses by employing widely accessible artifacts as sites of analysis or is there  
something  genuinely  philosophical  about  these  phenomena,  be  they  technological  
innovations or television shows?
I’ll  digress  a  bit  to  get  around to  the  angle  from which  I’d  like  to  answer  the 
question.
These  books  are  not  always  viewed as  respectable  scholarship  within  academic 
philosophy. In part, this is due to a kind of disdain for popular culture—whether 
based  in  the  “physics  envy”  that  drives  philosophy  (along  with  so  many  other 
disciplines) into ostentatious scientism or based in the elitist prejudice against the 
common and everyday, expressed well by Schopenhauer’s injunction of “minding not 
the times, but the eternities”—but in part it is no doubt due to some of these books 
simply not being very good. Of course, many journal articles aren’t great either, but 
when  working  on  the  margins,  and  when  prejudices  dispose  us  in  a  certain 
direction, it is easy to generalize from a bad first impression.
Sometimes, it may be that a book will suffer because the topic isn’t  particularly 
philosophical.  After  all,  these  are  books  for  a  general  audience,  and  having  a 
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sufficient fan base to support sales is  an important part of  how these titles are 
selected. But that already makes me suspicious of any judgment that a book might 
be bad due to its unphilosophical topic: my intuition is that, if something is popular, 
it must be striking a chord with a great number of people, and must therefore be in 
touch with or  at least  touching upon a few tensed strings of  the soul,  to  use a 
Nietzschean image. I’m inclined to say that if  it’s popular, it must be worthy of 
philosophical investigation—although there may be some topics that are popular 
because they allow people to explore things worth exploring and others that merely 
prey upon or exploit things worth exploring. A clear case: people read Philip K. Dick 
in part because his stories allow them to work through fascinating issues of fate, 
time, and human value. An ambiguous case: people don’t listen to iPods because 
they  want  to  work  through  questions  of  identity  and  community,  but  in  the 
listening,  they  are  working through those issues.  And a clear case on the other 
extreme: people watch Here Comes Honey Boo Boo or truly mindless violent action 
movies because they want to experience but not work through worthwhile issues—
ridicule  and passive  catharsis  are ways of  not  thinking,  although the objects  of 
thought that they are not thinking about are not less worthwhile, just more difficult 
to engage “fans” on. So, while the massive popularity of something seems to me to 
be clear evidence that it connects to philosophically valuable territory, the mode of 
public engagement may be variously open or closed to exploration of that territory. 
My perspective here also informs how I serve as editor to these volumes. I believe 
that  philosophy  has  retreated  from  public  life  today,  for  complex  and  multiple 
reasons,  but  that  people  have  not  ceased to  be  interested  in  and engaged  with 
philosophical  issues.  Just  as  today,  lamentably,  when  journalists  want  a 
commentator on straightforwardly philosophical topics like meaning and values in 
contemporary  life,  they  turn  to  psychologists  or  religious  figures,  rather  than 
philosophers, so too, when people want to explore philosophical issues they turn to 
fiction,  film,  and  scripture  rather  than  to  philosophy.  Popular  culture  may  not 
always  do  it  well  or  even  take  a  helpful  approach,  but  the  fact  is  that  today, 
philosophical work is being carried out by and through popular culture. What I ask 
of authors in these volumes, and what I strive for in my own writing on popular 
culture, is to draw out the philosophical work already taking place,  and to give 
“fans” language and theories to better do the work that they were already doing 
through popular culture. The worst of chapters in these books, in my view, are those 
that simply use the element of  popular culture  as  an opening to bring in some 
basically foreign topic from academic philosophy. “Oh, you like [whatever movie]? 
Well,  let  me tell  you  about  something  really interesting!”  It’s  disrespectful  and 
simply false to think that non-philosophers aren’t philosophical; the difference has 
less than we often think to do with content and meaning, and more than we often 
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think to do with style, tradition, and rigor. Now, that’s not nothing, but it’s also not  
everything.
Implied  in  the  proliferation  of  new media  technology  is  the  erosion  of  corporate  
control of the digital landscape. One of the ways corporations combat the collapse of  
the user/producer binary is through what you've termed "systematic colonization,"  
whereby  information  companies  price  innovation  beyond  use  by  independent  
producers. Can you explain the process by which systematic colonization takes place  
and why you believe that it leads to a renewed feudalism?
I’m adapting the notion of “systematic colonization” that Marx discussed in Capital,  
Vol. I,1 wherein the interests of the mother country are enforced by establishing a 
set price for unowned land in the colonies (where “unowned” is, of course, predicated 
on out-of-hand dismissal of any native rights). In this circumstance of abundance, 
the labourer is reunited with the means of production and artificial scarcity must be 
introduced if profits are still to be extracted. In the digital space, wherein we are all  
colonists,  the interests of  established economic powers are enforced by a similar 
prevention  of  free  employment  of  the  means  of  production  abundant  and  non-
competitively available to us. Through the abuse of patent portfolios, corporations 
are able to limit innovation by threat of lawsuits. Even a spurious claim of patent 
infringement  is  economically  devastating  to  the  entrepreneur  who  is  not  an 
established  economic  power,  ensuring  that  market  control  of  digital  spaces  is 
limited  to  those  corporations  able  to  afford  a  patent  dispute,  or,  more  often, 
possessing a patent portfolio deep enough to mount a counter-claim strong enough 
to  force  a  détente  or  licensing  exchange.  This  introduces  a  sort  of  re-emergent 
feudalism, in which we live and work in digital environments that we control and 
employ, but do not own. Just as the serf belonged to the land he worked, so too 
today we work on and with digital wares that we possess, but do not own.
Now,  this  is  from  my  2008  article,  “Revolutionary  Industry  and  Digital 
Colonialism.”2 Today,  an additional  form of  digital  colonialism is  in  place,  most 
visible  in  discussions  of  SNS  privacy  and  of  “big  data.”  Our  movements  and 
activities in digital  spaces produce data that is  collected, mined, and monetized. 
User activities, although they are not always experienced as labour, are subject to 
exploitation  insofar  as  they  generate  surplus  value  extracted  by  owners.  The 
revenue  generated  from  our  browsing  histories  and  Facebook  postings  are  not 
1 Karl Marx, Capital Vol. I, Marx-Engels Collected Works, v. 35., New York: International Publishers (1996), 755–
59.
2 D.E.  Wittkower,  “Revolutionary  Industry  and  Digital  Colonialism,”  Fast  Capitalism 4.1  (2008):  n.p. 
http://www.uta.edu/huma/agger/fastcapitalism/4_1/wittkower.html.
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shared with us, but are instead fed back into systems further integrating us into 
consumption and crypto-alienated production: consumption insofar as our explicitly 
or implicitly expressed desires (for example, explicitly through Facebook likes or 
implicitly through cookie tracking of browsing activity) allows retailers to stalk and 
surround us through targeted advertising, and crypto-alienated production through 
ever more “frictionless” and entertaining modes of sharing data. This is “crypto-
alienated”  production  in  that  it  is  motivated  by  and  serves  interests  that  are 
genuinely social and not themselves alienated—I do not, for example, talk politics 
with my friends because it helps Facebook figure out how to sell information that 
Old Navy will use to target their advertising—and yet it produces surplus value 
that I have no rights to and no control over the use of. 
Here we see another form of re-emergent feudalism. We prosumers produce value 
through  our  activity–now  obscured  as  “playbour”  rather  than  as  clear  labour—
which becomes salable through massive aggregation into “big data.” The control, 
autonomy, and unalienated personal motivations of our online activities constitute 
our surface experience of the system, but as a mode of production, we are serfs: our 
production serves the interests of and generates profits for the landed corporate 
aristocracy, which unilaterally accumulates value from and exercises control over 
our digital lives. As Metafilter user blue_beetle (Andrew Lewis) put it on Aug. 26, 
2010, “If you are not paying for it, you're not the customer; you're the product being 
sold.”3
Switching topics,  one of the unintended consequences of digitization has been an  
increased emphasis on intellectual property rights and how such rights might be  
violated.  In the past,  you've argued that digital  capitalism undermines modes of  
production based on capital accumulation,  in part,  by bridging the  gulf  between  
laborers and productive means. To what extent has digitization exposed the fictional  
side  of  capital  accumulation  and  in  what  ways  might  this  make  possible  a  
rethinking  of  intellectual  property,  ownership,  and  the  alienating  effects  of  
privatization?
I first taught Computer Ethics in 2001 and have taught that course and others 
touching on the topic of intellectual property rights (IPR) periodically from then to 
the present. The student views on IPR that I’ve heard have changed dramatically 
over these dozen years. In those earliest years of the aughts, the starting point for 
students  was  the  basic  Lockean  labour-desert  legitimacy  of  IPR,  with  the 
3 It  is  interesting to  note  that  Andrew Lewis,  whose comment was an act  of  socially-motivated prosumption 
benefitting Metafilter, has since personally commodified his own crypto-alienated conversational act by selling 
clothes featuring the now-slogan on a CafePress store (http://www.cafepress.com/youretheproduct),  which is 
now profiting (albeit with profit-sharing) from his playbour.
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motivating  image  of  the  hardworking  struggling-artist-musician.  Many  of  these 
students  had  been  Napster  users,  who  freely  admitted  to  using  LimeWire  and 
BearShare to illegally download music, even though they had a pretty firm belief 
that what they were doing was wrong. That’s no longer the default position, among 
my students at least, and there is now a noticeable contingent who have exactly the 
opposite position—who believe firmly that IPR, in its current form at least, is a form 
of extortion, and who do not freely admit to illegally downloading music, but instead 
use legal streaming services and legally purchase downloads.
The  way  I  read  this  is  that  the  RIAA/MPAA/BSA4 approach  helped  to  win  the 
battle,  but  clearly  helped  to  lose  the  war.  The  extreme  fines  imposed  and  the 
unreasonable  term length  of  the  Copyright  Term Extension  Act,  combined  with 
judgmental ads based on clearly questionable analogies (that you’re prevented from 
skipping  on  some DVDs,  surely  a  way  to  make  your  audience  hostile)  and  the 
terroristic singling-out of individual downloaders (and/or their relatives in whose 
names the internet access is provided)—those students who are aware of some or all 
of this are keenly aware that IPR is an instrument of control; Realpolitik whose 
image of  the “starving  artist”  appears now only  as  a  broken mask,  split  at  the 
seams, and more an indictment of the cynicism of the copyright industries than a 
moral  cover  for  them.  To  be  sure,  the  threat  of  massive  and  disproportional 
penalties has been effective in disincentivizing filesharing, but I’m not sure that 
would have been decisive, even for those students who say they never download, 
were those disincentives not accompanied by new options for listening, like Spotify, 
and the rationalization of pricing structures driven by competition from new online 
mp3 sellers, like iTunes—and those less abusive economic arrangements may have 
been sufficient on their own to win this battle, to whatever extent it has been won.
The  ideological  fallout,  though,  has  been  significant.  When  we  move,  in  my 
philosophy of technology course, from discussion of IPR in the established copyright 
industries to more forward-looking questions about 3D printers, RapRep systems, 
and DIY chemical synthesis,  students seem to immediately and instinctively ask 
questions and air concerns using social welfare and user rights as a starting point, 
rather than asking questions having any basis in property rights. Confronted with 
the possibility  of  home synthesis  of  medicine,  they do not  worry about  whether 
pharmaceutical firms will remain profitable—they wonder how much the public can 
achieve as self-organizing communities of concern with full access to the means of 
production, and how much energy will be (mis?)directed at formulating new means 
of  recreational  psychopharmacology.  Confronted  with  the  possibility  of  printing 
your own assault rifles, and how to look out for the public good in this not-unlikely 
4 Recording  Industry  of  America,  Motion  Picture  Association  of  America,  and  Business  Software  Alliance, 
respectively. 
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future, not a word is wasted on the idea of code-based, DRM, or CSS-style solutions. 
The starting assumption, at least in this limited sample of young folks with whom I 
get to talk about this stuff in depth, is that the cat is out of the bag, and the bag, for  
its part, has more than holes enough to let the sunshine through.
What  I’m  still  not  seeing  is  a  sense  of  class  consciousness  among  we  digital 
proletarians.  Both in my classroom and in what I’m seeing in the online  public 
discourse, there is umbrage at all sorts of separate forms of digital colonization and 
exploitation—resale  of  personal  data,  privacy  violations,  clickwrapping,  end-user 
license agreements, abusive pricing, and so forth—but little sense of the way that 
these separate elements form a system of class struggle. I’m not at all sure that the 
sense that informational space is an occupied territory will emerge until the means 
of production are advanced enough that the public is technically, but not legally, 
capable of affordably producing physical goods. In the meantime, I still hold to what 
I argued at the start of “Revolutionary Industry and Digital Colonialism”: it is the 
digital means of production that have taken on the role of the revolutionary class. I 
hope, though, that we gain class consciousness before it brings about the revolution, 
so that new systems of production can be put in place in accordance with human 
values,  rather  than  determined  merely  by  the  scripts,  valences,  and  accidental 
politics of technologies as they happen to be developed; so that new systems can be 
guided by social and user contexts, rather than simply design context.
If you don't mind me being cute for a second, you contend that the decentralization of  
communication  toward  the  individual  should  be  taken  seriously  by  scholars,  
regardless  of  the  seriousness  of  a  communication's  content.  This  need  becomes  
particularly apparent when one considers "cute" memes, such as pervasive pictures  
of cats posted on the website I Can Haz Cheeseburger. If it's true that theoreticians  
must seek value in communications that exist, rather than those privileged by their  
own philosophical considerations, what value do cute memes have for understanding  
both the objects of new media and the cultures in which these memes circulate?
I don’t think it should be controversial that, to understand something, you should 
study what it is—not least of all the parts that are not predicted by our models or 
precedents (and are not mere anomalies). Memetic play, cuteness, and cat pictures 
certainly fall into that category. (Although certainly, for each, we can find a history, 
but  not  of  the  scale  and  prominence  that  would  have  made  current  behavior 
expected, even in retrospect.)
I  admit  that  I  take a  certain  perverse  pleasure in  seeking out,  theorizing,  and 
defending things dismissed as trivial, unimportant, and silly,  but there are good 
reasons to do so in addition to my own temperament.  A fundamental insight of 
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standpoint  epistemology  is  that  those  marginalized  in  society  have  a  privileged 
perspective  created  by  their  exclusion.  The  contours  of  a  thing  emerge  from 
background  into  perception  at  the  edges.  The  places  I  like  to  look  are  not  the 
margins  of  digital  culture,  but  the  margins  of  our  theoretical  engagement  with 
digital  culture—I  am,  after  all,  a  philosopher  rather  than  a  sociologist.  So  my 
intuition is that by attempting to recuperate devalued elements of digital culture I 
should be able to identify revealing moments within larger systems in the same way 
and  for  the  same  reasons  that,  for  example,  a  feminist  perspective  is  able  to 
highlight elements of male-dominated culture that may otherwise escape notice. 
Behaviors  marginalized  by  theorists  open  different  and,  perhaps,  unique 
possibilities for theoretical insight and critique.
The prevalence of the aesthetic  category of the cute in digital  culture may be a 
response to the coldness and distance of  online  interaction.5 The cute  abuts  the 
helpless and the manipulative. A sad dog with its leg in a cast can be cute. An 
unhappy cat getting a bath can be cute. The word itself used to be a negative term 
for a coy neediness, becoming positive and “endearing” only during the 20th century. 
Cuteness calls upon us; it is a modality of the experience of being needed. This is 
one possible factor in the ascent of the cute in digital culture; it is safe to assume 
that there are multiple factors in play. Perhaps the interest in the cute is not as 
easily commodified as other emotional drives—drives of dominance or sexual desire, 
for  example—and so  emerges  to  an  unexpected  extent  once  the  means of  mass 
communication  become  generally  available  through  new  media.  Perhaps  the 
democratization of communications allowed for the emergence of emotional content 
previously undervalued by a male dominated business environment that relegated 
the interest in cuteness to specific demographics, and which failed to recognize that 
enjoyment of the cute was not coextensive with “girlishness.” Surely there are many 
who share cute animal pictures who are not among the Sanrio clientele, and the 
brony  community  shows  that  the  masculinist  exclusivity  of  men  from  girlish 
cuteness may be fading. 
Part of the cute and lolcat phenomena, though, has to do with the process of play 
itself rather than the particular content. We can see this clearly in Amazon review 
hijacking, most famously in the Three Wolf Moon Tee.6 At the time of writing, the 
product has 2,286 customer reviews, largely attesting to the virility imparted by the 
product. In the top-voted review, with 30,622 people saying they found it “helpful,” 
B. Govern wrote:
5 D.E. Wittkower, "On the Origins of The Cute as a Dominant Aesthetic Category in Digital Culture," in Putting 
Knowledge to Work and Letting Information Play, eds. Timothy Luke and Jeremy Hunsinger, Rotterdam: Sense 
Publishers (Springer), 167-175: http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-6091-728-8/page/1.
6 See:  http://www.amazon.com/The-Mountain-Three-Short-Sleeve/dp/B002HJ377A.
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This item has wolves on it which makes it intrinsically sweet and worth 5 
stars by itself, but once I tried it on, that's when the magic happened. After 
checking to ensure that the shirt would properly cover my girth, I walked 
from  my  trailer  to  Wal-mart  with  the  shirt  on  and  was  immediately 
approached by women. The women knew from the wolves on my shirt that I, 
like a wolf, am a mysterious loner who knows how to 'howl at the moon' from 
time to time (if you catch my drift!). The women that approached me wanted 
to know if I would be their boyfriend and/or give them money for something 
they called mehth. I told them no, because they didn't have enough teeth, and 
frankly a man with a wolf-shirt shouldn't settle for the first thing that comes 
to him.
The  process  is  a  kind  of  directionless  and  emergent  crowdsourced participatory 
comedy, which is perhaps just a complicated way of saying that this review thread 
represents thousands of people virtually hanging out and screwing around. This is 
an interruption of  nonsense and play in  a virtual  space  of  commerce  through a 
repurposing of a forum intended to allow prosumers to generate market value for 
Amazon  through  crowdsourced  quality  control—but  the  user  intension  is  not 
specifically disruption or culture-jamming, but simple social play. It is a pure and 
beautiful thing.
I’ve sought out other kinds of disparaged online behavior to attempt to validate as 
well.  In  a  recent  article,7 I  criticize  the  ongoing  philosophical  debate  about 
friendship online in order to make sense of and assign proper value to the practice 
of sharing photographs of one’s lunch. It seems reasonable to say that, if your theory 
of friendship cannot make sense of a widespread social practice, the problem is more 
likely that your theory is wrong than that people are wrong to think that there’s 
subjective purpose and meaning in the actions they choose to engage in. I argue 
that an Aristotelian prejudice has led us to ignore views of friendship as a process of 
shared experience; that we focus too much on friendship as a path to knowledge and 
virtue,  and  fail  to  notice  the  quotidian  texture  of  friendship  in  wasting  time 
together, sharing meals, drinking, and shooting the shit. As long as you think that a 
picture  of  a  sandwich  is  meant  as  a  communication  or  that  it’s  aimed  toward 
something,  you’re  pretty  well  driven  to  the  conclusion  that  people  today  are 
narcissistic or stupid. But the photograph of the sandwich isn’t a communication, 
it’s part of an opt-in asynchronous shared virtual experience—it is an invitation to 
lunch. For similar reasons, I’ve also argued that one of the major and unappreciated 
reasons  for  Facebook’s  massive  success  is  the  way  it  provides  affordances  for 
7 D.E.  Wittkower,  “’Friend’ is  a  Verb,”  APA Newsletter  on  Philosophy  and  Computers 12.1  (2012),  22–26: 
http://www.apaonline.org/APAOnline/Publications/Newsletters/Past_Newsletters/Vol11/Vol_11.aspx.
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valuable  social  forms  of  boredom.8 Being  bored  along  with  others  allows  us  to 
explore  questions  of  meaning  and  value  in  a  kind  of  existential  free-play  of 
individual purpose, and we should recognize the value of our own boredom in the 
same way and for the same reason that we recognize the value of the wasted hours 
of our childhood, wandering through woods and streams or playing with sticks and 
throwing rocks.
There’s a political dimension to this as well. If we reconceptualize time spent on 
Facebook as at  least  sometimes  constitutive  of  a  life  lived together  with  others 
(asynchronously  and  at  a  distance),  then  not  only  does  that  allow  us  to  think 
differently about online friendship, it also allows us to think differently about the 
city and its political meaning. Arendt argues that living in proximity with others 
provides the conditions that allow power to emerge. If we can adapt this to our lives 
online, as I argue we can, then we can make better sense of how some Occupy Wall 
Street  occupations  have  been  successful  in  maintaining  a  sufficient  sense  of 
community and agency on Facebook, after being evicted from physically occupied 
spaces, to allow them to continue to organize and take direct actions offline.9 So, 
that’s my attempt to rehabilitate “clicktivism”; another widespread but disrespected 
online activity that has been too quickly dismissed.
My next  planned project  in  this  purposefully  unlikely  trajectory  has  to  do  with 
bacon. It was a “weird news” piece about bacon-flavored shaving cream that made 
me realize that the online mania for all things bacon—bacon band-aids, bacon plush 
toys, bacon cologne, bacon scented candles, bacon toothpaste, bacon memes, Epic 
Meal Time, etc.—called for theorization. It’ll be a little while before I can make time 
to work on this, but my basic intuition is that this represents a kind of comforting 
and regressive retreat to a set of comfort-food experiences in emotional accord with 
an ideal  and ideology  of  authenticity—familiarity  of  taste,  the  earthy flavors  of 
wood and salt, the physical torpor produced by too much and too heavy food—which 
is, however, being adopted in a post-auratic, ironic, and hyperreal fashion, in accord 
with the social media environment of consciously performed “authenticity” of self. 
There  are  also  elements  of  fan  culture,  but  transformed  to  fit  into  the  more 
universal context of our Facebooked sociality—talking about bacon can provide the 
cultural  cachet  of  the  insider  reference,  while  excluding  almost  nobody.  So  I’m 
looking forward to finding time to write that up.
8 D.E. Wittkower, “Boredom on Facebook,” in  The Unlike Us Reader,  eds.  Geert Lovink and Miriam Rasch, 
Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures (2013): http://networkcultures.org/wpmu/portal/publication/unlike-us-
reader-social-media-monopolies-and-their-alternatives.
9 D.E.  Wittkower,  “The  Vital  Non-Action  of  Occupation,  Offline  and  Online,”  International  Review  of  
Information Ethics 18 (December, 2012): http://www.i-r-i-e.net/index.htm.
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I’ve  also  been  wanting  to  write  about  the  twinned  post-feminist  prosumptive 
fantasies embodied by Etsy and Pinterest for a while. The explosion of new hybrids 
of ideology and (re)appropriation, set loose in the shifting ecosystem of life under 
late capitalism, provides niches in which so many new ways of cyborg living can 
thrive.  We’re  in  the  midst  of  our  own  digital-human  Cambrian  explosion,  and 
fascinating things are happening everywhere.
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